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FAIR HOUSING AND ONLINE FREE SPEECH
COLLIDE IN FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL OF SAN
FERNANDO VALLEY V. ROOMMATES.COM, LLC
INTRODUCrION
The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed en banc its holding in Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC.1
The en banc court went to great lengths to downplay the gaps in rea-
soning that pervaded the initial ruling that Roommates.com-a room-
mate matching website-could be held liable for information posted
by third parties on the site.2 Still, the holding directly contradicts pre-
cedent from the Ninth Circuit and other courts, as well as the clearly
expressed goals of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). 3
The decision, likely motivated by the important civil rights concerns
that arise from discriminatory housing ads posted at the site, was well
intended. Nothing in the court's decision, however, would prevent its
holding from extending into other areas that do not implicate the
same social justice considerations. To the contrary, the court's holding
narrows the immunity that § 230 of the CDA grants to computer and
Internet services so that it becomes virtually meaningless. 4 Moreover,
contrary to the CDA's purpose, the decision creates uncertainty that
will encourage website operators to continue using old technologies
they know fit within § 230's immunity rather than experiment with
new technologies.5
Part II of this Note explores the legislative intent of § 230, past
cases relating to the scope of § 230 immunity, and the panel and en
banc decisions in Roommates.com.6 Part III argues that the Ninth
Circuit's decision may encourage Internet services to refrain from
1. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC (Roommates.com II),
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008), affg en banc 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 1169.
3. Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137 (1996) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000)); see, e.g., 47 U.S.C, § 230(c)(1) ("No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider."); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339
F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003).
4. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
5. Cf. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) ("It is the policy of the United States ... to encourage the devel-
opment of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by indi-
viduals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services.").
6. See infra notes 10-113 and accompanying text.
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sorting and organizing information in user-friendly, accessible ways,
contradicting Congress's desire that § 230 would promote technologi-
cal innovation that facilitates the exchange of information online. 7
Further, Part III argues that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's opinion,
§ 230's broad grant of immunity, as interpreted by the vast majority of
the courts, is still useful and necessary in today's online world. 8 Part
IV elaborates on the devastating implications that the Ninth Circuit's
decision may have for free speech on the Internet if courts do not
carefully limit the decision in the future.9
II. BACKGROUND
This Part explores the purposes behind § 230 as evidenced by the
statute's language and court opinions that have interpreted it. Section
A discusses the purposes of § 230.10 Section B describes the consen-
sus interpretation of § 230.11 Section C explores the departures from
this consensus view in the context of the Fair Housing Act, focusing
on Roommates.com. 2
A. Purposes of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act
Congress enacted § 230 of the CDA in 1996 to encourage the devel-
opment of filtering software to prevent children from accessing por-
nography on the Internet.13 Section 230 provides that "[n]o provider
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the pub-
lisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider. ' 14 Congress included this language in response to
two cases, which both held that computer services could be liable for
failing to monitor or remove illegal content posted by a third party.15
Congress viewed these holdings as an unwanted disincentive for com-
7. See infra notes 121-167 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 168-200 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 201-212 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 59-113 and accompanying text.
13. Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 172-74 (2006) (reviewing the CDA's legislative history).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000). The terms "website operator," "computer service provider,"
"computer service," and "internet service provider," as used in this Note, all refer to "provider[s]
or user[s] of an interactive computer service" under § 230. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
15. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that
an Internet service provider could be liable for defamation materials posted by a third party if it
"knew or had reason to know" of the defamatory content); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (concluding
that a computer service opened itself up to liability for third-party content by advertising that it
had the ability to control and monitor such content).
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puter services seeking to develop filtering software that would allow
parents to prevent their children from accessing pornography or other
inappropriate materials. 16 -Congress's goals, however, extended be-
yond incentivizing technologies that would filter inappropriate con-
tent from children. Congress expressly stated its. more general intent
to incentivize the development of technologies that would improve
the Internet overall, for children and adults.17 Congress designed
§ 230 to provide widespread protection, and courts have held that the
four types of claims specifically excluded by the statute18 constitute an
exhaustive list of exceptions to § 230's immunity.19
Encouraging computer services to filter inappropriate content from
their websites by shielding them from liability when third parties post
such content on their sites may seem counterintuitive. 20 Congress,
however, hoped to allow computer services to develop filtering
software to control their content without exposure to liability for the
inevitable shortcomings of their control mechanisms. 21 Congress also
chose this route-and chose not to impose harsh penalties on com-
puter services for failing to develop such filters-to protect the free
flow of ideas and information on the Internet.22 Congress made this
intention explicit in the statutory language.23
16. Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Congress enacted § 230 to remove
the disincentives to self regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision. Under that court's
holding, computer service providers who regulated the dissemination of offensive material on
their services risked subjecting themselves to liability .... "); cf. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) ("It is the
policy of the United States ... to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies .... ).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2) ("It is the policy of the United States ... (1) to promote the
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other inter-
active media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.").
18. The statutory exclusions are claims involving any "Federal criminal statute," "any law per-
taining to intellectual property," "any State law that is consistent with this section," and "the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act." 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(4).
19. See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (E.D. Va. 2003) (re-
jecting the argument that § 230 does not apply to federal civil rights claims, stating that "[o]nly
four classes of claims are excluded").
20. Section 230 does not diminish the potential liability of the party that actually posted the
material. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
21. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[One] reason for enacting § 230(c)
was to encourage interactive computer services and users of such services to self-police the In-
ternet for obscenity and other offensive material, so as to aid parents in limiting their children's
access to such material."); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).
22. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 ("Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to
freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.").
23. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3), (b)(2).
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B. Consensus Interpretation of § 230
One court has noted that "there is an apparent tension between
Congress's goals of promoting free speech while at the same time giv-
ing parents the tools to limit the material their children can access
over the Internet. '24 Still, § 230's two goals can converge to achieve
another purpose recognized by Congress-encouraging innovations
that allow users to control and customize the information they receive
online.25 Such technologies allow parents to prevent their children
from accessing obscene materials and enhance the free flow of infor-
mation by making the Internet more easily navigable.26 Accordingly,
courts have continually rejected arguments that a computer service
can lose its § 230 immunity by making it easier for users to find the
information they seek.2 7
Almost immediately after the enactment of § 230, courts also ad-
dressed the meaning of the word "publisher" in the statute: "No pro-
vider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another informa-
tion content provider."'2 8 The Fourth Circuit first confronted the
question in Zeran v. AOL, Inc.29 There, the plaintiff sued AOL for its
failure to remove allegedly defamatory 30 third-party content after the
24. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) ("It is the policy of the United States ... to encourage the develop-
ment of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individu-
als, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services.").
26. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2) ("[Internet] services offer users a great degree of control over the
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as
technology develops.").
27. See, e.g., Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007)
(holding that Lycos did not lose its immunity by assisting subscribers in posting information
through the construct of its website-a message board where users posted comments about pub-
licly traded companies); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (9th Cir.
2003) (concluding that a dating website was immune from liability for content of user profiles
created by the website's forms because the forms merely "facilitated the expression of informa-
tion by individual users"); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that Amazon.com was not liable for content of user-written book reviews posted in a
section seeking comments on a book).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
29. Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
30. Although § 230 immunity often is an issue in defamation suits, courts have immunized
computer services from liability in cases dealing with a wide variety of other federal and state
claims. See, e.g., Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727-28 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (holding
that a website which introduced the plaintiff to an underage woman with whom he had sex,
resulting in criminal charges being brought against him, was immune from liability under theo-
ries including contract, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresenta-
tion, breach of warranty, violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and failure to
warn).
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plaintiff informed AOL of the content.31 The Fourth Circuit rejected
the plaintiff's argument that § 230 immunity only applies to publisher
immunity, leaving distributor liability intact.32 The court held that dis-
tributor liability was merely a subset of publisher liability.33 The court
reasoned that the plaintiff's suggested system of notice-based liability
would contradict Congress's goal of encouraging computer services to
self regulate, as any attempt to do so would likely lead to notice and
thereby open the door to liability. 34
The vast majority of courts have agreed with Zeran,35 even in cases
where the defendant played an active role in obtaining the unlawful
content at issue.36 The only notable exception is the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Doe v. GTE Corp., which called Zeran into doubt in
dicta.37 The Seventh Circuit noted that Zeran's interpretation of § 230
would not serve Congress's goal of encouraging computer service
providers to filter obscene materials. 38 Instead, computer service
providers would likely become "indifferent to the content of informa-
tion they host or transmit" and, therefore, they would not likely take
costly precautions when they could instead "take the do-nothing op-
tion and enjoy immunity. '39 A more sensible approach, the Seventh
Circuit suggested, would be to immunize only those sites that had at
least attempted to monitor illegal materials. 40 No other circuits have
adopted the interpretation of § 230 suggested by the Seventh Circuit's
dicta, and commentators have criticized it as inconsistent with the leg-
islative history of § 230.41
Instead, courts have applied a three-pronged test to determine
whether a computer service is eligible for immunity under § 230.42
31. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.
32. Id. at 332. The plaintiff argued that a distributor can be held liable when it has actual
knowledge of the defamatory statements at issue. Id. at 331.
33. Id. at 332.
34. Id. at 331 ("Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services,
interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of
messages posted.").
35. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003); Green v. AOL, 318 F.3d 465,
471 (3d Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. AOL, 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000).
36. See supra note 27.
37. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003). The California Supreme Court
recently reversed a decision holding that a computer service lost its immunity once it became
aware of the unlawful content. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006), rev'g 9 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
38. Doe, 347 F.3d at 660.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 660-61.
41. Myers, supra note 13, at 175-78.
42. Schneider v. Amazon.com, 31 P.3d 37, 39-40 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
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First, a court must determine whether the defendant qualifies as a
"provider or user of an interactive computer service. ' 43 The statute
defines an interactive computer service as
any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a com-
puter server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered
by libraries or educational institutions. 44
Courts have rejected the notion that a computer service must actually
provide access to the Internet in order to qualify.45 Also, though
Zeran suggested that Congress intended § 230 to immunize large In-
ternet service providers that cannot possibly monitor all the content
that they host,46 subsequent courts have immunized computer services
of all scopes and sizes.47
Second, courts must look to whether the information for which the
plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable is "information provided
by another information content provider. '48 A computer service can
lose its immunity when it becomes an "information content provider"
that is "responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or develop-
ment of [the] information" at issue. 49 As previously mentioned, a
computer service does not become an information content provider
merely by facilitating the posting of information by third parties
through its design features. 50 In fact, courts have refrained from clas-
sifying computer services as information content providers even
43. See id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000) ("No provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.").
44. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
45. See, e.g., Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007)
("Providing access to the Internet is, however, not the only way to be an interactive computer
service provider.").
46. Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ("It would be impossible for service
providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems.").
47. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (determining that the sole
publisher of an e-mail newsletter about museum security is potentially immune under § 230).
48. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see Schneider, 31 P.3d at 39. A court construed the term "informa-
tion" broadly. See Green v. AOL, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that software
created to temporarily "punt" people off AOL qualified as information).
49. 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3).
50. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d at 419 (holding that a website operator is immune for allegedly de-
famatory information about a company's stock posted on a message board designed for com-
mentary on publicly traded stocks); Schneider, 31 P.3d at 43 (concluding that an online




where the service played an active role in gathering the content at
issue.51
Finally, courts must look to whether the claim would treat the de-
fendant as the "publisher or speaker" of information created by a
third party.5 2 If the claim would do so, then the computer service
would be immune. As previously noted, all courts outside the Seventh
Circuit have defined "publisher" broadly53 and have generally re-
jected attempts to place traditional publisher claims outside of the
publisher category.5 4 Claims seek to treat computer services as pub-
lishers when plaintiffs attempt to impose liability on a defendant for
exercising "a publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as de-
ciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content. '55
Courts have also allowed operators of computer services to actively
participate in discussions without losing immunity for third-party
contributions.5 6
Even the Seventh Circuit's narrower interpretation of the word
"publisher" would likely protect computer services that attempt to
perform these functions.5 7 A court in the Northern District of Illinois,
interpreting GTE Corp., reasoned that in order to hold a computer
service liable for changes, additions, or deletions it had made to third-
party content, a plaintiff would have to prove that the damages arose
51. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. AOL, 206 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
that e-mails from the defendant to a third party requesting that it correct inaccurate information
did not make the defendant an information content provider); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (upholding immunity for an Internet service provider where the
provider paid the columnist who wrote the defamatory content and advertised his columns to the
public as gossip columns).
52. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); Schneider, 31 P.3d at 39.
53. See, e.g., Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
54. See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538 (E.D. Va. 2003) (re-
jecting a claim that the lawsuit against AOL for comments made in a chat room sought to hold
AOL liable as the owner of a place of public accommodation rather than as a publisher).
55. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
56. Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 719-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (rejecting the
argument that the defendant lost immunity by "control[ling] the 'content of the discussion' ...
by posting messages of his own, commenting favorably or unfavorably on messages posted by
others, selectively deleting some messages while allowing others to remain, and selectively ban-
ning users whose messages he deems disruptive").
57. Lower courts in the Seventh Circuit, however, have indicated that they would be less kind
to computer services that did not attempt to exercise these publisher functions in the first place.
Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681,
697 (N.D. 11. 2006) ("[I]t seems rather unlikely that, in enacting the CDA and in trying to pro-
tect Good Samaritans from filtering offensive conduct, Congress would have intended a broad
grant of immunity for ICSs that do not screen any third-party content whatsoever."), affd, 519
F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
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from the actual changes themselves rather than the surrounding third-
party material. 58
C. Roommates.com and other Fair Housing Act
Cases Applying § 230
Causes of action under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA)59 are
not exceptions to the immunity granted by § 230. 60 Still, on two re-
cent occasions, civil rights organizations alleged that website operators
violated the FHA by hosting housing ads posted by third parties that
specify the race, gender, sexual orientation, or other characteristics of
a desired tenant or roommate.61 Subsection 1 discusses the Seventh
Circuit's recent attempt to resolve the tension between the FHA and
§ 230 in Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law,
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc. 62 Subsection 2 explains the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach to similar issues in Roommates.com. 63
1. Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law,
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.
In Craigslist, recently affirmed by the Seventh Circuit,64 the defen-
dant website allowed users to post housing ads, and provided a num-
ber of suggested and required fields which users would fill in to create
the text of their ads.65 The users were also able to place their ads
under the categories: "(1) rooms & shares, (2) apartments for rent,
(3) housing swap, (4) office & commercial, (5) parking & storage, (6)
58. Id. at 695 ("By altering content, an ISP would no longer be posting information provided
by 'another content provider ... .
59. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).
60. See Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 698 ("Section 230(c)(1) bars claims, like the CLC's claim,
that requires publishing as a critical element.").
61. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC (Roommates.corn I),
489 F.3d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigslist, 461 F.
Supp. 2d at 685. The Fair Housing Act provides in part:
[I]t shall be made unlawful . . . [tjo make, print, or publish, or cause to be made,
printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale
or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention
to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
62. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 69-113 and accompanying text.
64. Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666
(7th Cir. 2008), affg 461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. I11. 2006).
65. Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
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real estate for sale, (7) sublets & temporary, and (8) vacation rentals
"66
The plaintiff alleged that this process qualified Craigslist as a pub-
lisher of discriminatory housing ads posted by its users.67 Despite the
Seventh Circuit dicta supporting a limited view of § 230 immunity, the
district court held that Craigslist was indeed immune, because impos-
ing liability for printing the discriminatory ads would "treat Craigslist
as if it were the publisher of third-party content. '68
2. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC
Unlike Craigslist, the roommate matching site Roommates.corn
(Roommate) was sued in a federal circuit that abided by the broader
Zeran interpretation of § 230 immunity. 69 The Ninth Circuit had pre-
viously held that an operator of an e-mail listserv who personally se-
lected the messages to forward on to his subscribers was potentially
immune in Batzel v. Smith.70 Similarly, in Carafano v. Metros-
plash.com, Inc., the Ninth Circuit upheld immunity for a dating web-
site that provided questionnaire forms that members used to create
profiles. 71
Accordingly, the District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com, LLC granted Roommate's summary judgment motion on
the basis of its § 230 immunity for the content posted by its users.72
66. Id. at 684 (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 685. A list of the objectionable ads that appeared on Craigslist appears in the opin-
ion. Id. at 685-86.
68. Id. at 698; see also id. at 690 n.7 ("[U]nder § 230(c) . .. so long as a third party willingly
provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity
regardless of the specific editing or selection process." (quoting Carafano v. Metrosplash.com,
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2003))).
69. Roommates.com 1, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008).
70. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit remanded the case
for a determination of whether the operator of the listserv should have known that the senders
of the e-mails did not intend for their e-mails to be published. As long as a reasonable person in
the operator's position would have reasonably concluded that the e-mails were intended for
publication, immunity should apply. Id. at 1035.
71. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124-25 ("[T]he fact that Matchmaker classifies user characteristics
into discrete categories and collects responses to specific essay questions does not transform
Matchmaker into a 'developer' of the 'underlying misinformation."').
72. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, No. CV 03-
09386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004), rev'd in part and remanded
489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Finding no distinction between Roommates.com and the defendant
dating website in Carafano, the district court concluded:
Roommate cannot be liable for violating the FHA arising out of the
nicknames chosen by its users, the free-form comments provided by
the users, or the users' responses to the multiple choice question-
naire. Plaintiffs' federal claims against Roommate are therefore
barred by the CDA.73
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that Roommate's actions rendered
it an information content provider:
This is not a case in which the plaintiffs are attempting to hold
Roommates liable for its passive role in serving as a conduit for
discriminatory statements made by third-party users. On the con-
trary, here plaintiffs are attempting to hold Roommates liable for its
own conduct and for causing and requiring its users to make dis-
criminatory statements. 74
The plaintiffs further argued that Roommate had "played a significant
role in creating [or] developing the particular information at issue."'75
First, the plaintiffs argued that the website was not immune for its own
inquiries in its questionnaire forms, which asked users to disclose their
gender and familial status.76 Next, the plaintiffs contended that the
website lost its immunity by "causing" its users to indicate the pre-
ferred gender and familial status of potential roommates. 77 Addition-
ally, the plaintiffs argued that the website's pull-down menus forced
users to choose between two discriminatory options.78 Finally, the
plaintiff argued that holding the website liable for these alleged FHA
violations would not conflict with Congress's desire to protect free
speech on the Internet by enacting § 230,79 because "[t]here is no
73. Id, at *4.
74. Appellants' Opening Brief at 18, Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-56916).
75. Id. at 20 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carafano,
339 F.3d at 1125).
76. See id. at 23.
77. See id. ("The Councils' asserted claims seek to treat Roommates as the entity directly
causing discriminatory statements to be made. They do not seek to treat Roommates as the
publisher or speaker of information.").
78. Id. at 24 ("Roommates tells users to select between A and B, and where both A and B are
discriminatory, the user's ultimately [sic] selection of A cannot be said to be the tortious act of
the user alone. By creating the two discriminatory choices and telling the user to select among
them, Roommates plays a 'significant role' in the provision of the information at issue.").
79. See generally Jennifer C. Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Im-
plications of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REv.
969 (2002) (arguing that the reasons for the FHA's regulations of discriminatory housing ads are
magnified in the context of the Internet and that § 230 should not immunize computer services
from violations of the FHA).
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value in promoting the free exchange of discriminatory housing
advertising." 80
The defendant, Roommate, countered that the case was analogous
to Carafano,81 where the defendant provided similar questionnaires
for users to create their member profiles. 82 Roommate further argued
that "[a]ny preferences expressed in a Roommates.com posting-in-
deed, the decision to post anything on Roommates.com-originate
with the user, and no decisions regarding content are made by Room-
mate."' 83 An amicus brief from Amazon.com, America Online, eBay,
Google, Tribune Company, Yahoo!, Netchoice, and the United States
Internet Service Provider Association supported the defendant's posi-
tion.84 The brief argued that limiting Roommate's immunity would
contradict the goal expressed in § 230 to "preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.'"85
The Ninth Circuit sided with the plaintiffs on most of these issues,
however, finding several grounds upon which the defendant could be
liable if the content at issue did indeed violate the FHA.86 First, the
court held that the defendant could be liable for causes of action aris-
ing from the questionnaires that it created and published itself.8
7
Next, the court held that the defendant was not entitled to summary
judgment on the question of its liability for members' answers to its
questionnaires. 88
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the case from Carafano on the
grounds that the member who posted the content in Carafano dis-
80. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 74, at 27-28.
81. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[So long as a
third party willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider
receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process.").
82. Roommate.com, LLC's Answering Brief as to the Judgment and Opening Brief as to At-
torneys' Fees and Costs at 30, Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 04-56916, 04-57173).
83. Id. at 24.
84. Brief of Amici Curiae Amazon.corn et al. in Support of Roommate.com, LLC, Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 04-
56916, 04-57173).
85. Id. at 21; 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000).
86. Roommates.com I, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008). The court did not reach the question of whether the content at issue actually violated the
FHA. Id. at 927 ("At this stage, we are only concerned with whether Roommate is immune
from liability under the CDA, not whether it actually violated the FHA.").
87. Id. at 926 ("Roommate is a content provider of these questionnaires and does not qualify




obeyed the website's instructions, creating a prank profile for a fa-
mous actress rather than posting his own information. 89 Therefore,
the court reasoned that the defendant in Carafano did not prompt or
solicit the prankster to post the content at issue, 90 and thus Carafano
might not control in a case where the website more directly prompted
the illegal content. 91
To illustrate this point, the court discussed a hypothetical website
called www.harassthem.com, where visitors would be asked to provide
private or defamatory information about others, which the website
would then post online.92 The website would acquire the information
by inviting users to identify their target by providing his name, ad-
dress, social security number, bank account, and other such informa-
tion.93 The website would inform users that the information they post
"need not be confirmed, but could be based on rumor, conjecture or
fabrication. ' 94 The court noted, "Carafano did not consider whether
the CDA protected such websites, 95 and we do not read that opinion
as granting CDA immunity to those who actively encourage, solicit
and profit from the tortious and unlawful communications of
others."96
The court, however, did not reach the issue of whether Room-
mates.com was indeed analogous to the harassthem.com hypotheti-
cal.97 Instead, it held that the website had lost its § 230 immunity by
89. Id. at 927-28 ("The prankster in Carafano provided information that was not solicited by
the operator of the website. The website sought information about the individual posting the
information, not about unwitting third parties. Nothing in the questions the dating service asked
suggested, encouraged or solicited posting the profile of another person ... .
90. Id. at 928.
91. Id. ("We are not convinced that Carafano would control in a situation where defamatory,
private or otherwise tortious or unlawful information was provided by users in direct response to
questions and prompts from the operator of the website.").
92. Roommates.com 1, 489 F.3d at 928.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Judge Ikuta disagreed with this section of the opinion in his concurrence:
We have previously rejected expansive interpretations of this phrase and have explicitly
held that a website operator does not become an information content provider by solic-
iting a particular type of information or by selecting, editing, or republishing such infor-
mation .... [U]nder § 230(c), therefore, so long as a third party willingly provides the
essential published content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity re-
gardless of the specific editing or selection process."
Id. at 933-34 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part) (quoting Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003)).
96. Id. at 928 (majority opinion).
97. See id. ("While mapping the outer limits of Carafano's protection of websites that solicit
and post users' responses is an interesting and difficult task, we need not undertake it today
because Roommate does more than merely publish information it solicits from its members.").
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"channeling" the information that its users provided in their profiles. 98
For example, the website only allowed members to search the profiles
of other members who fit their preferences and sent members custom-
ized e-mail notifications that only included listings compatible with
the preferences the members indicated through their profiles.99
Though acknowledging that Roommates.com provides a "useful ser-
vice" by creating these customized listings, the court stated that "[b]y
categorizing, channeling and limiting the distribution of users'
profiles, Roommate provides an additional layer of information that it
is 'responsible' at least 'in part' for creating or developing," 100 thus
making it an information content provider outside § 230's
protection. 101
Though the court did not analyze whether Roommate had indeed
violated the FHA, it indicated in a footnote that it could be swayed to
utilize this reasoning to depart from precedent on § 230 immunity:
[I]f a hypothetical website required members to identify themselves
by race, under Roommate's logic, the CDA would protect this site if
it prevented members who listed themselves as "African-American"
or "Asian" from viewing any "Whites Only" listings. We doubt this
is what Congress had in mind when it passed the CDA. 102
On the other hand, the court held that Roommate could not be held
liable for encouraging users to post comments in the "Additional
Comments" 10 3 portion of the profile questionnaire by advising users
that "[w]e strongly recommend taking a moment to personalize your
profile by writing a paragraph or two describing yourself and what you
are looking for in a roommate. 1 04 Thus, the court found that "Room-
mate's involvement is insufficient to make it a content provider of
these comments,"11 5 and the court reasoned that "Roommate's open-
98. Rommates.com 1, 489 F.3d at 929.
99. Id. at 928-29.
100. Id. at 929.
101. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (0(3) (2000).
102. Roommates.com 1, 489 F.3d at 929 n.9.
103. The "Additional Comments" section often produced the most objectionable responses,
including users' statements that they would "[p]ref[er] white Male roommates" or were "NOT
looking for black muslims." Id. at 929.
104. Id. (alterations in original).
105. Id. Judge Reinhardt disagreed with this portion of the opinion in his partial dissent,
stating, "the 'Additional Comments' portion is an integral part of the entire 'users' profiles,'
which Roommate 'categoriz[es], channel[s] and limit[s] [in] distribution."' Id. at 931 (Reinhart,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alterations in original). He also felt that Room-
mate "prompted" members to state discriminatory preferences in the Additional Comments
section:
[W]hen viewed in the context of the entire sign-up process that conveys the message to
prospective users that they should express their preferences for tenants based on race,
gender, sexual orientation, national origin and religion, ordinary users would under-
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ended question suggests no particular information that is to be pro-
vided by members .... 106 Much criticism followed the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision, 107 and Roommate soon petitioned the court to rehear
the case en banc. 108 The Ninth Circuit granted the petition on Octo-
ber 12, 2007.109.
The en banc court affirmed the panel over the vigorous dissent of
three judges. 110 The court repeatedly emphasized that § 230 immunity
would remain undisturbed except in extreme cases and would not ex-
tend to other contexts, including traditional search engines."' It fo-
cused on the idea that Roommates.com not only allowed users to seek
illegal information, but forced them to select their gender and sexual
orientation from a pull-down menu and sorted user profiles accord-
ingly, thereby facilitating potentially illegal housing discrimination."12
The en banc court explicitly recognized the "prompting" exception to
§ 230 immunity that the panel had explored in its "harassthem.com"
dicta: "The CDA does not grant immunity for inducing third parties
to express illegal preferences. Roommate's own acts-posting the
questionnaire and requiring answers to it-are entirely its doing. '113
III. ANALYSIS
In affirming the panel decision, the Ninth Circuit erred in three
ways. First, the Ninth Circuit's holding contradicts Congress's public
policy goals in adopting § 230.114 Second, the holding is irreconcilable
with the consensus interpretation of § 230,115 which the Ninth Circuit
stand the recommendation to constitute a suggestion to expand upon the discrimina-
tory preferences that they have already listed.
Id. at 932.
106. Id. at 929 (majority opinion).
107. See, e.g., Howard J. Bashman, When Should a Commercial Web Site Be Held Liable for
User-Generated Content?, LAW.COM, May 21, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900
005555285.
108. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com, LLC, 506 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 04-56916, 04-57173).
109. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 506 F.3d 716, 716
(9th Cir. 2007). The en banc court consisted of the Chief Judge and ten additional judges drawn
by lot, pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 35-3.
110. Roommates.com 11, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
1ll. Id. at 1169, 1174-75 ("The message to website operators is clear: If you don't encourage
illegal content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be
immune.").
112. Id. at 1164.
113. Id. at 1165.
114. See infra notes 121-167 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 168-187 and accompanying text.
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adopted in Batzel v. Smith.116 This consensus interpretation provides
widespread immunity to computer service providers for suits treating
them as publishers of third-party content, regardless of the service's
efforts to facilitate or even prompt the content at issue. 117 Enforce-
ment of the FHA provision against Roommate would treat Room-
mate as a publisher of third-party content.'1 8 Because it would be
virtually impossible for Roommate to prevent discriminatory ads
before they are posted, the claim against Roommate seeks to hold the
website liable for failing to exercise its "traditional publisher func-
tions," such as screening content, deleting content, editing content,
and choosing whether to delete or edit content.119 Section 230 has
consistently barred such suits. Third, the civil rights implications of
the FHA do not justify a departure from the consensus interpretation
of § 230 and regardless, the Ninth Circuit's holding does little to re-
solve these civil rights concerns since, even after Roommates.com,
websites can still post users' discriminatory housing ads as long as the
discriminatory language is not in response to a direct prompt by the
website.120
116. 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,
1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that the court's decision in Batzel "joined the consensus
developing across other courts of appeals that § 230(c) provides broad immunity for publishing
content provided primarily by third parties").
117. See, e.g., Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121 (holding that an online dating service was immune
for a profile posted using forms it had provided because the test for immunity is whether the
computer service created "the portion of the statement or publication at issue"); Batzel, 333 F.3d
at 1028 (holding that an operator of an e-mail newsletter on museum security who often distrib-
uted e-mails sent to him by subscribers was immune for distributing a defamatory e-mail regard-
ing stolen artwork if the e-mails were intended for publication); Smith v. Intercosmos Media
Group, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-1964, 2002 WL 31844907, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 17, 2002) (concluding
that a domain name registrar was immune from liability arising from a third party's registration
of an allegedly defamatory domain name); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C.
1998) (determining that AOL was immune from liability arising from allegedly defamatory state-
ments contained in a column even when it paid the author for the right to publish and advertised
the column as containing "gossip"); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 715 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (concluding that § 230 immunized eBay for responses posted in its Feedback Forum,
which allows eBay users to rate their satisfaction with other users' conduct during transactions
by responding to forms provided by the website); Stoner v. eBay, Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL
1705637, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2000) (holding that an online auction site was immune
from liability arising from goods sold by a third party using its forms); Schneider v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 31 P.3d 37. 43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an online bookseller was immune from
liability for book reviews posted on a website using fields provided by the bookseller).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000) (making it illegal "to make, print, or publish, or cause to
be made, printed, or published" discriminatory housing advertisements (emphasis added));
Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41-42 (stating that § 230 bars suits that include publication as an element of
a claim.).
119. Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1997).
120. See infra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
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A. Roommates.com Contradicts Congress's
Intent in Adopting § 230
The public policy implications of a particular case cannot override
Congress's clear intent in enacting § 230.121 Congress adopted § 230
to address the public policy concern of obscenity, and § 230 reflects
Congress's decision that widespread immunity is the best way to deal
with the issue in the online context.122 There is no reason to believe
that members of Congress would have viewed the concerns arising
from illegal housing ads any differently, and if they had, they would
have expressed this concern by adding FHA suits to the list of excep-
tions to § 230 immunity that are laid out by the statute. 23
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's holding contradicts § 230's pur-
pose of encouraging the development of software and other tools that
would increase the usefulness and navigability of the Internet.12 4 By
imposing liability because Roommates.com asked users specific ques-
tions and made their responses searchable to other users, but declin-
ing to impose liability for the open-ended "Additional Comments"
forms, 125 the court penalizes computer services for making their web-
sites more user-friendly. The Ninth Circuit and other courts have long
held that providing users with options and allowing users, on their
own, to select options through drop-down menus or other means does
not constitute development of the responses that users themselves
select.12 6
Congress enacted § 230, in large part, to overrule Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., which held that the defendant could be
liable for third-party content by editing content. 27 Had the defendant
taken a hands-off approach, the court noted, it would have been a
121. See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538-40 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(upholding immunity for a civil rights claim alleging that an Internet chat room was a place of
public accommodation and stating, "Congress's decision to exclude certain claims but not federal
civil rights claims as a group... must be respected"); see also Roommates.com 11, 521 F.3d 1157,
1183 (9th Cir. 2008) (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
"[w]hether the information at issue is unlawful and whether the webhost has contributed to its
unlawfulness are issues analytically independent of the determination of immunity" and that
immunity would be pointless if it did not immunize unlawful conduct).
122. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4)-(5) (2000).
123. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(2), (4) (Section 230 does not apply to claims under a "Federal
criminal statute," "pertaining to intellectual property," or entailing "application of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986," or similar state statutes).
124. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a), (b)(1)-(3).
125. Roommates.com 1, 489 F.3d 921, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008).
126. Roommates.com H, 521 F.3d at 1182 (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003)).
127. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2003).
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mere "distributor" rather than a publisher, and would not have been
liable for content posted by third parties.128 Congress overruled this
holding so that computer services would not fear that attempting to
achieve the nearly impossible goal of screening and removing offen-
sive online content would subject them to liability for their inevitable,
occasional failure.129
The Roommates.com court goes even further than the Stratton
Oakmont court, which Congress overruled by passing § 230. The
Stratton Oakmont court did not question that a website that made no
effort to edit or screen third-party postings could not be held liable for
any unlawful content in those postings.1 30 Rather, the only question
in Stratton Oakmont was whether websites could lose this immunity
by attempting to screen unlawful third-party postings.131 Roommate
made no effort to screen its users' postings for unlawful or offensive
content. As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, Roommate's only inter-
ferences with its users' posts are intended not to screen the posts, but
to allow its service to be more useful and navigable132-precisely the
type of innovation that Congress sought to protect. The en banc court
attempted to limit the scope of § 230 to cases exactly like Stratton
Oakmont, but, as the dissent pointed out, the immunity granted by
§ 230 extends far beyond the case that spurred the statute's
enactment. 133
128. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) ("PRODIGY has uniquely arrogated to itself the role of determin-
ing what is proper for its members to post and read on its bulletin boards. Based on the forego-
ing, this Court is compelled to conclude that for the purposes of Plaintiffs' claims in this action,
PRODIGY is a publisher rather than a distributor.").
129. Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Fearing that the specter of liabil-
ity would ... deter service providers from blocking and screening offensive material, Congress
enacted § 230's broad immunity[,]" which "forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a ser-
vice provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.").
130. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
131. Id.
132. Roommates.corn 1, 489 F.3d 921, 929 (9th Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008). The panel stated:
While Roommate provides a useful service, its search mechanism and email notifica-
tions mean that it is neither a passive pass-through of information provided by others
nor merely a facilitator of expression by individuals. By categorizing, channeling and
limiting the distribution of users' profiles, Roommate provides an additional layer of
information that it is "responsible" at least "in part" for creating or developing.
Id.
133. Roommates.com H, 521 F.3d 1157, 1179 (9th Cir. 2008) (McKeown, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("But that case does not cabin the scope of the statute, and the back-
ground leading up to enactment of the CDA is no substitute for the language of the statute
itself.").
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The en banc court also made the case that Roommate, if immune
from liability, might get away with online conduct that would be ille-
gal in the real world. 134 However, as the dissent again argued, this was
precisely what § 230 was intended to do: "Even though traditional
publishers retain liability for performing essentially equivalent acts in
the 'non-virtual world,' Congress chose to treat interactive service
providers differently by immunizing them from liability stemming
from sorting, searching, and publishing third-party information.' 1 35
One reason for this is to encourage the unfettered development of the
Internet. Contrary to the majority's view,136 Congress apparently be-
lieves that the Internet still needs "coddling" because it had not re-
pealed or amended § 230.137 Moreover, while in the real world one
must only avoid conduct that would break laws applicable in their own
jurisdiction, holding websites responsible for any laws their users
might break "puts the webhost in the role of a policeman for the laws
of the fifty states and the federal system."'138
Furthermore, the same technologies that allowed Roommates.com
to sort user-supplied information could likely be used to filter obscen-
ity or offensive content. Congress intended to encourage such tech-
nologies139: Congress surely realized that technology does not
develop in a bubble and that technologies that help filter obscene con-
tent would not arise only in that exact context. Even those proposing
that websites must screen discriminatory housing ads have suggested
that "[t]he same filtering technology currently used to block obscene
language could be configured to block discriminatory words and
phrases from classified housing listings.' 140 The Ninth Circuit effec-
tively prevents Roommate from developing and utilizing the same fil-
tering technologies that Congress intended § 230 to incentivize.141
The Roommates.com holding threatens fundamental online technol-
ogies, including rating and feedback features (allowing users to pro-
vide feedback regarding goods and services they have purchased
134. Id. at 1167 (majority opinion) ("If such screening is prohibited when practiced in person
or by telephone, we see no reason why Congress would have wanted to make it lawful to profit
from it online.").
135. Id. at 1176 (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 1174 n.39 (majority opinion).
137. Id. at 1188 (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Id.
139. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2000) ("It is the policy of the United States ... to remove disin-
centives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower
parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material
.. .. .).
140. Chang, supra note 79, at 1007.
141. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).
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online) and tagging (websites' common practice of associating certain
content with user-provided labels or "tags" in order to allow Internet
users to conduct effective web searches). 142 Ironically, the Room-
mates.com holding would penalize the only feasible way for an online
housing website to screen thousands of third-party housing ads for po-
tentially discriminatory content-searching for particular buzzwords
that indicate potential FHA violations.' 43
Roommates.com also casts a new layer of doubt upon the scope of
CDA immunity. The Ninth Circuit's holding that a website can lose
its immunity by making user-posted content searchable is particularly
confusing, as nearly all content on the Internet is searchable in some
way or another. Previously, the Ninth Circuit clearly explained in
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. that "so long as a third party will-
fully provides the essential published content, the interactive service
provider receives full immunity.' 44 In fact, Carafano presented a sce-
nario virtually identical to Roommates.com, and the court in Carafano
properly recognized that responses to questionnaires, multiple choice
menus, and questions that called for users to check a box all qualify as
third-party content because the user willfully chose to answer the
questions posed by the website. 145 Search results are similarly user-
initiated; they are the product of search inquiries and information pro-
vided by third parties. 146
Congress did not intend to penalize computer services for assisting
users in sifting through the endless stream of online information in
order to find the information that best suits their needs. But under
Roommates.com, a website that provides mechanisms that allow users
to search its contents could be held liable despite § 230.147 Once
again, this holding directly contradicts Ninth Circuit precedent. In
Batzel, for instance, the operator of an e-mail listserv personally se-
lected the user-created e-mails to pass along to his subscribers. 48 The
court reasoned that, so long as the e-mails were created by a third
142. Amici Curiae Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Lycos Inc., and Professor Eric
Goldman in Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8-9, Fair Hous. Council of San Fer-
nando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 506 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 04-56916, 04-57173).
143. See Chang, supra note 79, at 1006 (arguing that the burden placed on a computer service
if it were required to remove discriminatory housing ads would be minimal because "the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has published advertising guidelines that de-
scribe the kinds of words and phrases that would likely be deemed to violate § 3604(c)").
144. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
145. Id.
146. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 108, at 6.
147. Id. at 6-7.
148. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003).
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party, the operator was immune from liability arising from the e-mails
that he selected to distribute.149
Here, no Roommate personnel sifted through the profiles posted on
the site in response to users' searches for compatible roommates. The
process was entirely automated. 150 It would be irrational for a com-
puter service to maintain its immunity when its operator personally
chose to distribute the allegedly illegal e-mail at issue, but lose its im-
munity when the search process was fueled by precisely the kind of
technological innovation that Congress sought to promote through
§ 230.151 The Ninth Circuit has recognized Congress's goal of promot-
ing innovation in the past,152 but in Roommates.com it seems to have
forgotten Congress's clearly expressed intentions.
The en banc opinion at least clarifies that the court's intention is not
to subject search engines to liability for facilitating searches for poten-
tially illegal content.1 53 The opinion, however, does not offer further
instruction on where to draw the line and when exactly a website's
"encouragement" of unlawful content transforms it into an informa-
tion content provider.154 Therefore, despite the warning to err on the
149. Id. The court explained:
Obviously, Cremers did not create Smith's e-mail. Smith composed the e-mail entirely
on his own. Nor do Cremers's minor alterations of Smith's e-mail prior to its posting or
his choice to publish the e-mail (while rejecting other e-mails for inclusion in the list-
serv) rise to the level of "development." As we have seen, a central purpose of the Act
was to protect from liability service providers and users who take some affirmative
steps to edit the material posted. Also, the exclusion of "publisher" liability necessarily
precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among
proffered material ....
Id.
150. See Roommates.com 1, 489 F.3d 921, 928 (9th Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008).
151. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1)-(2), (b)(3) (2000).
152. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2003). The court
explained:
Matchmaker's decision to structure the information provided by users allows the com-
pany to offer additional features, such as "matching" profiles with similar characteris-
tics or highly structured searches based on combinations of multiple choice questions.
Without standardized, easily encoded answers, Matchmaker might not be able to offer
these services and certainly not to the same degree. Arguably, this promotes the ex-
pressed Congressional policy "to promote the continued development of the Internet
and other interactive computer services."
Id.
153. Roommates.corn 1, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008).
154. Id. ("If you don't encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users to
input illegal content, you will be immune."); id. at 1184 (McKeown, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that the majority's rule "can be tucked in, let out, or hemmed up to fit




side of immunity in "close cases,"'15 5 it is likely that websites will re-
spond by playing it safe and making their sites less searchable, less
interactive, and less user-friendly. At the very least, the case will
likely discourage websites from using pull-down menus, a common
and useful tool on the Internet. 5 6
The dangers posed by the Ninth Circuit's unprecedented approach
were exemplified by Judge Reinhardt's partial dissent in the panel de-
cision, which expanded the majority's reasoning into a position that
would almost entirely dispense with § 230 immunity. 157 Judge
Rienhardt believed that Roommate should be subject to liability even
for content posted by users in the "Additional Comments" box when
creating their profiles.' 58 He reasoned that including the "Additional
Comments" box along with its searchable user profiles and distribut-
ing these profiles to its members adds a layer of information to the
content provided by the users who created the profiles. 5 9 Further-
more, even if the "Additional Comments" boxes do not directly
prompt users to post illegal content, users might perceive the com-
ment boxes as an invitation to post further discriminatory content
when taken in context with the pull-down menus.160
While the majority opinion would transform a statute intended, in
part, to encourage the development of the Internet into a disincentive
for computer services to seek to enhance the usefulness and navigabil-
ity of their websites, Judge Reinhardt's proposed rule would nullify
§ 230 altogether. A website asking users to review a book, album, or
restaurant could be perceived by users as licensing them to defame the
subject of their review. Judge Reinhardt's vague speculation about
how a user might perceive a website's invitation to contribute content
155. The court noted:
Websites are complicated enterprises, and there will always be close cases where a
clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did encouraged the ille-
gality. Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut
the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten thousand duck-
bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or encouraged-or at least tacitly assented
to-the illegality of third parties.
Id. at 1174 (majority opinion).
156. Id. at 1176 (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("By exposing every
interactive service provider to liability for sorting, searching, and utilizing the all too familiar
drop-down menus, the majority has dramatically altered the landscape of Internet liability.").
157. See Roommates.com 1, 489 F.3d 921, 930 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("I join Judge Kozinski's opinion for the court, except for its holding that
the Communications Decency Act ... immunizes Roommate from liability with respect to the
statements contained in the 'Additional Comments' section of users' profiles.").
158. Id.
159. Id. at 931.
160. Id. at 932.
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encourages website operators to make their sites as difficult to navi-
gate as possible. The only safe option would be a wide-open forum,
forcing users to find whatever information they are looking for by sim-
ply scrolling through the website from top to bottom.161 If this was all
that Congress intended to protect, it did not need to pass § 230. Web-
sites that served as mere conduits for third-party information were
already protected by the bar on distributor liability before Congress
enacted § 230.162
In opposing the rehearing, the plaintiffs in Roommates.com at-
tempted to avoid this obvious inconsistency with established prece-
dent by claiming that, because Roommate's screening of user profiles
to make them search-friendly by compatible members is not an act of
speech or publication, these acts do not fit within the scope of § 230
immunity.163 Instead, the plaintiffs argued that the liability imposed
on Roommate stemmed from the act of limiting the housing ads that a
user is able to see based on discriminatory criteria. 64 Even if the
plaintiffs' interpretation were accurate, the argument must fail be-
cause it is the act of filtering content that Congress hoped to protect
and encourage with § 230.165
The plaintiffs further claimed that Roommate was incorrect in its
"suggestion that the panel decision would transform websites into
'content providers' of their search results."1 66 The decision, however,
clearly did just that, holding that "[b]y categorizing, channeling and
161. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 108, at 7-8 ("If the decision is allowed to
stand, all interactive computer services that facilitate the collection of information through stan-
dardized criteria or that allow selection of information from their databases will be treated as
'information content providers'....").
162. Id. at 16 (citing Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
While Cubby, Inc. was decided before § 230 was enacted, the court in Cubby, Inc. did note:
CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publication than does a public
library, book store, or newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to
examine every publication it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it
would be for any other distributor to do so. First Amendment guarantees have long
been recognized as protecting distributors of publications .... Obviously, the national
distributor of hundreds of periodicals has no duty to monitor each issue of every peri-
odical it distributes. Such a rule would be an impermissible burden on the First
Amendment.
776 F. Supp. at 140 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
163. Appellant's Response to Appellee's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 20, Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 506 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 04-
56916 & 04-57173) [hereinafter Appellant's Response for Rehearing].
164. Id. ("The claim is that Roommate is liable for its act of limiting access to housing infor-
mation on the basis of protected status.").
165. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2000).
166. Appellant's Response for Rehearing, supra note 163, at 20.
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limiting the distribution of users' profiles, Roommate provides an ad-
ditional layer of information that it is 'responsible' at least 'in part' for
creating or developing. ' 167 The decision thereby renders Roommate
an information content provider on the sole basis that it utilized avail-
able technologies to make its service more user-friendly by allowing
members to find compatible roommates without having to sort
through thousands of profiles.
B. Roommates.com Contradicts Established Precedent
Equally problematic is the panel opinion's attempt to distinguish
the case from Carafano on the basis that, in Carafano, the poster of
the content posted a false profile of an actress rather than following
the site's instructions to post information about himself.168 As noted
in Roommate's petition for rehearing, this distinction interjects an un-
precedented "good faith" requirement into § 230 immunity. 169 There
is no language in § 230 limiting immunity to content that the website
operator did not want posted. 170 In fact, aside from Carafano most
§ 230 cases upheld websites' immunity for third-party postings of ex-
actly the kind that the website was intended for.171 Limiting § 230 to
the kind of content that websites did not intend for users to post
would be akin to the "notice-based" liability theory that courts have
uniformly rejected since Zeran.172 If a website does not lose its immu-
nity after being informed of a specific illegal posting, it would be illog-
ical for it to lose its immunity merely because a posting followed the
site's general guidelines and therefore, presumably, could have been
167. Roommates.corn I, 489 F.3d 921, 929 (9th Cir. 2007), aff'd en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008).
168. Id. at 928. The court noted:
Nothing in the questions the dating service asked suggested, encouraged or solicited
posting the profile of another person .... Carafano provided CDA immunity for infor-
mation posted by a third party that was not, in any sense, created or developed by the
website operator-indeed, that was provided despite the website's rules and policies.
Id.
169. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 108, at 8 ("There is no basis for an interpre-
tation of the CDA that requires a court to evaluate the nature and purpose of a defendant's
service and deny protection to those that gather and publish third-party content with an
agenda."); see also Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (re-
jecting proposed "good faith" requirement for § 230 immunity).
170. See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
171. See supra note 117.
172. Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the argument that
AOL lost its immunity by failing to take down allegedly defamatory postings after it had been
notified of the postings by the plaintiff).
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anticipated by the website operators. 173 Such a rule could be ex-
tended to mean that a political blog that seeks user's comments is not
immune from liability for a user's comments on political issues, since
that is the type of content for which the website was intended, but
would be immune if a user decided to post a defamatory comment
about celebrity fashion. Precedent for this kind of hair-splitting is no-
where to be found in the language of § 230.
Furthermore, the Roommates.com panel pulled this distinction out
of thin air, as the Carafano court never mentioned whether or not the
user had disobeyed the websites' instructions. The Carafano court fo-
cused on the fact that, regardless of the website's questionnaires and
prompts, no third-party content existed until the user himself either
wrote it or selected it.174 While the Roommates.com court focused on
the idea that the website "prompted" the responses at issue through
its pull-down menus, Carafano explicitly rejected the identical argu-
ment.175 The only language in Carafano that comes close to proposing
such a distinction is the court's statement that "the profile directly
reproduced the most sexually suggestive comments in the essay sec-
tion, none of which bore more than a tenuous relationship to the actual
questions asked.' 76 However, this statement referred to the essay
portion of the profile, analogous to the "Additional Comments" por-
tion of the Roommates.com profiles. Both Roommates.com opinions
acknowledged that the website did not lose its immunity for the con-
tents of that section.' 77
173. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 529 (Cal. 2006) (holding that § 230 protects
even those computer services that take an "aggressive role" in soliciting and publishing third-
party content).
174. In fact, the Carafano court noted:
The fact that some of the content was formulated in response to Matchmaker's ques-
tionnaire does not alter this conclusion. Doubtless, the questionnaire facilitated the
expression of information by individual users. However, the selection of the content
was left exclusively to the user. The actual profile "information" consisted of the par-
ticular options chosen and the additional essay answers provided. Matchmaker was not
responsible, even in part, for associating certain multiple choice responses with a set of
physical characteristics, a group of essay answers, and a photograph. Matchmaker can-
not be considered an "information content provider" under the statute because no pro-
file has any content until a user actively creates it.
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
175. Id. at 1125 ("Carafano responds that Matchmaker contributes much more structure and
content ... by asking 62 detailed questions and providing a menu of 'pre-prepared responses.'
However, this is a distinction of degree rather than of kind, and Matchmaker still lacks responsi-
bility for the 'underlying misinformation.').
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Roommates.com H, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008); Roommates.com 1, 489 F.3d 921,
929 (9th Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
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The Roommates.com panel's discussion of the hypothetical
"www.harassthem.com" website178 is equally misguided. Courts have
already considered very similar scenarios and determined that they
did indeed qualify for § 230 immunity. One such case involved a web-
site that included posts falsely accusing local political officials of spy-
ing on residents through their bedroom windows, stealing public
records, abusing drugs, and needing psychiatric care. 179 The website
operator quickly removed any messages that accused him of wrongdo-
ing, but he left the obviously false and likely defamatory postings re-
garding public figures untouched. 180 The plaintiff argued that "[t]he
format of the discussion forum encourages the use of harassing, de-
famatory, obscene and annoying messages."'18 Citing Carafano, the
court stated, "Whether [the defendant's] conduct facilitated the post-
ing of the defamatory messages has no bearing on his immunity sta-
tus .... The fact remains that the 'essential published content,' the
defamatory statements, were provided by third parties.' 182
Similarly, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, a district court held that AOL
was immune where it not only encouraged a third party to post defam-
atory content, but also paid the third party for the right to host his
column, which AOL admitted in advertisements was a "gossip" col-
umn. a83 Though the court's language indicated that it would have
liked to have held AOL liable, the court properly recognized that
Congress's intent was clear from the statute. 184 The court asked, rhe-
torically, "Why should AOL be permitted to tout someone as a gossip
columnist or rumor monger who will make such rumors and gossip
'instantly accessible' to AOL subscribers, and then claim immunity
when that person, as might be anticipated, defames another?"1 85 The
court's answer, essentially, was "because the statute says so."186 The
178. Roommates.com 1, 489 F.3d at 928.
179. Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 713 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
180. Id. at 716.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 726.
183. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C. 1998).
184. Id. at 49. The court noted:
Whether wisely or not, it made the legislative judgment to effectively immunize provid-
ers of interactive computer services from civil liability in tort with respect to material
disseminated by them but created by others .... While Congress could have made a
different policy choice, it opted not to hold interactive computer services liable for their
failure to edit, withhold or restrict access to offensive material disseminated through
their medium.
Id.
185. Id. at 51.
186. See id. at 52. The court explained:
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en banc court's exception for soliciting or encouraging unlawful con-
tent, by contrast, is entirely unsupported by the statutory language. 187
C. The Civil Rights Concerns Implicated by FHA Cases Do Not
Justify a Departure from § 230 Immunity
The civil rights concerns created by the allowance of discriminatory
housing ads, of course, are at the heart of the plaintiffs' arguments.
As the plaintiffs pointed out, the court's holding that Roommate can-
not be held liable for the contents of the "Additional Comments" sec-
tion means that housing ads that are illegal in print can still be
published freely online.188
This case, however, is not the first § 230 case that involved signifi-
cant civil rights concerns. In Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., for ex-
ample, the plaintiff claimed that he and other Muslim AOL members
had been insulted and ridiculed in AOL chat rooms because of their
religious beliefs, and that AOL was unresponsive when the comments
were brought to its attention.189 The plaintiff unsuccessfully at-
tempted to circumvent § 230 by arguing that AOL did not act as a
publisher, but instead as the host of a place of public accommoda-
tion.1 90 The court, however, was clear that AOL was immune under
§ 230 for these comments.1 91 The court recognized that the language
of § 230 did not distinguish civil rights claims from other claims seek-
Congress has made a different policy choice .... In some sort of tacit quid pro quo
arrangement with the service provider community, Congress has conferred immunity
from tort liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet
for obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful
or not even attempted.
Id.
187. Roommates.com I, 521 F.3d 1157, 1187 (9th Cir. 2008) (McKeown, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
188. Appellant's Response for Rehearing, supra note 163, at 14 ("As a result of this holding,
fair housing laws making it unlawful to publish discriminatory housing advertisements-laws
operating successfully for 40 years-will have no effect on the only medium that matters in
today's marketplace: the Internet.").
189. Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (E.D. Va. 2003).
190. Id. at 536-37.
191. Id. at 538. In fact, the court pointed out:
Such a result would be counter to the statutory purpose of ensuring that the Internet
remain a "forum for true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cul-
tural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity." Thus, while parties
that post information in Internet forums remain accountable under all applicable fed-
eral and state laws, they cannot be reached indirectly through the imposition of liability
on the ISPs that serve as intermediaries in posting the information.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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ing to impose liability on a computer service for content created by a
third party.192
The initial Roommates.com holding-placing websites that
''prompt" potentially unlawful responses or allow users to search
these responses outside § 230's protection' 93-does not in any way
distinguish cases involving civil rights concerns from the standard on-
line defamation cases that have long been the domain of § 230. Even
scholars advocating for the online enforcement of the FHA's ban on
discriminatory housing ads have called for a judicially created excep-
tion applying only in the FHA context, rather than a large scale and
widely applicable cutback on § 230 immunity that clearly contradicts
congressional goals.194
These commentators have argued that, while fear of liability for
third-party defamation may scare computer services into taking a
"hands off" approach due to the difficulty of determining exactly what
is defamatory, the straightforward nature of the FHA provisions re-
garding discriminatory housing ads eliminates this concern for housing
ads. 195 This distinction is problematic. First, a rule of liability for
FHA violations online would essentially mean that § 230 only applies
to causes of action that would be hard to prevent without great ex-
pense. Congress certainly never expressed such an intention.196 Sec-
ond, even if any lay person could theoretically identify ads that violate
the FHA without much difficulty, the typical large-scale computer ser-
vice operator does not have an army of lay people available to browse
through every piece of content posted on its websites.197 Third, there
is no shortage of legal battles regarding varying interpretations of the
192. Id. at 539 ("In short, Congress's decision to exclude certain claims but not federal civil
rights claims as a group, or Title II specifically, must be respected." (citing TRW, Inc. v. An-
drews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001))).
193. Roommates.com 1, 489 F.3d 921, 928 (9th Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 521 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.
2008).
194. Chang, supra note 79, at 1004-05 ("Because an OSP's [Online Service Provider's] regula-
tion of indecent material would not make it any more or less likely to be liable for publishing
discriminatory housing listings, imposing FHA liability on OSPs would not threaten the impor-
tant congressional purpose of removing disincentives to OSP monitoring of indecent material.").
195. Id. at 1005. Jennifer Chang argued:
The Zeran court was concerned that the difficulty of determining whether a particular
statement is defamatory ... would lead OSPs to simply remove all postings for which
they received complaints, regardless of whether the statement was actually defamatory
or not. In the fair housing context, however, the determination as to whether an adver-
tisement expresses a discriminatory preference is based on the "ordinary reader test"-
a standard that, by definition, any lay person can apply to an advertisement on its face.
Id.
196. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
197. Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ("The amount of information com-
municated via interactive computer services is therefore staggering. The specter of tort liability
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FHA, a good number of which end up reaching the U.S. Supreme
Court. 198 This indicates that interpreting the FHA is not as easy as
these commentators suggest.
This theoretical discussion is unnecessary, though, because § 230
provides a list of exceptions to its immunity, and neither the FHA, nor
civil rights suits in general, are included on that list.199 It is entirely
possible that Congress, acting in 1996 during the Internet's relative
infancy, did not anticipate the potential civil rights ramifications of
§ 230.200 If this is the case, though, plaintiffs must bring their cause to
the legislature rather than attempting to convince the courts to invent
paths around clearly established law. Indeed, nearly all potential
causes of action that could be brought against computer services
based on third-party content implicate substantial public policy con-
cerns, including privacy rights and the need to guard against obscenity
and harassment. If one exception is invented on this basis, other ex-
ceptions will likely follow.
IV. IMPACT
The Ninth Circuit's decision could have disastrous ramifications for
free speech on the Internet.201 Section 230 recognizes that "[t]he In-
ternet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural devel-
opment, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity" and that "[t]he
Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regula-
tion. '' 20 2 This language makes clear that Congress intended § 230 to
promote free speech online.
The Internet's potential for interactivity allows it to offer a forum
for discourse and debate in ways that traditional media cannot. Users
are able to share their reactions to news and opinion pieces without
the space limitations and editorial interference of a traditional "Let-
ters to the Editor" page. Many online publications now allow Internet
in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible
for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems.").
198. See, e.g., City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003);
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (1995).
199. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
200. Chang, supra note 79, at 1002-03 ("Although some housing services were already being
provided over the Internet by 1995, the record contains no evidence that Congress wanted to
preclude the application of § 3604(c) to OSPs.").
201. See infra notes 202-212 and accompanying text.
202. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3)-(4).
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users to write and post their own news stories.20 3 Innovations such as
these must be encouraged, but Roommates.com creates a great deal of
uncertainty for website operators seeking to get users involved.
The en banc court went a step further than the panel, adopting the
exception to CDA immunity for "prompting" or "encouraging" un-
lawful content that the panel had proposed in dicta.20 4 Despite the en
banc court's best efforts to assure that the exception would only apply
in extreme cases, many questions remain. Would an online newspaper
with a liberal readership that asks readers for their views on a right-
wing political candidate be guilty of "soliciting" the inevitable defama-
tory responses? Could a website covering a community with failing
public schools allow readers to vent their frustrations with their chil-
dren's schools without having to worry that it would be liable if a
poster were to cross the line and defame an administrator? Could a
website poll its readers on whether they think a politician is telling the
truth about the scandal of the week, or would those who clicked the
"no" button put the website at risk of liability for defamation?
Roommates.com answers none of these questions, and without a
clear answer website operators are likely to refrain from involving
their users to avoid the risk. This certainly would not promote "the
policy of the United States ... to promote the continued development
of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other in-
teractive media. '20 5
If a website loses its immunity when it filters content and allows
users to search its content, website operators will be discouraged from
developing and using technology that would make the Internet more
user-friendly and navigable. The Internet provides a limitless supply
of information which would be virtually useless if users were not able
to search for the kind of content they are looking for. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding threatens the continued growth of technologies that al-
low Internet users to find what they want more easily.
If Roommates.com becomes an information content provider "[b]y
categorizing, channeling and limiting the distribution of users'
profiles, '20 6 then the popular online bookseller Amazon.com, for ex-
ample, also becomes an information content provider by recom-
203. See, e.g., TribLocal.com, http://triblocal.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2009); Chi-Town Daily
News, http://www.chitowndailynews.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
204. Roommates.com H1, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The message to website opera-
tors is clear: If you don't encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users to
input illegal content, you will be immune."); Roommates.corn I, 489 F.3d 921, 928 (9th Cir. 2007),
affd en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
205. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).
206. Roommates.corn I, 489 F.3d at 929.
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mending certain books to its customers based on their past purchases.
Suppose a Neo-Nazi purchases Adolf Hitler's Mein Kempf from Ama-
zon.com. The next time he logs in, Amazon.com might automatically
generate a list of recommendations based on the books that other
Mein Kempf readers purchased. This list may include other anti-Se-
mitic literature, such as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Ama-
zon.com may even send him a computer-generated e-mail informing
him of a newly published racist rant.
Does Amazon.com then become liable for the Neo-Nazi's bigoted
posts on its user comments pages after reading the recommended
books? If Amazon.com allowed users to chat about their favorite
books in real time, would its practice of recommending books to its
users impose a duty to constantly monitor and screen chat rooms set
up for users to discuss their purchases? If Amazon.com allows read-
ers who wish to post their feedback regarding Mein Kempf and other
books to rate the books from one through ten using a pull-down
menu, does that transform Amazon.com into an information content
provider for the rest of the readers' feedback? If so, Amazon.com
would almost certainly stop providing recommendations and user
comment forms, features that are certainly helpful to its customers
and that encourage free speech online.
One possible way that defenders of the Roommates.com court could
distinguish the Amazon.com example is that, though Amazon.com
recommends books to users, it does not prevent the users from view-
ing or buying books that were not recommended. Thus, Amazon.corn
does not "limit" the information available to users as Roommates.com
does by only allowing users to view the profiles of compatible poten-
tial roommates. A distinction on this basis, however, would contradict
the express purpose of § 230 to "to remove disincentives for the devel-
opment and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that em-
power parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material. '20 7 Indeed, deeming a website such as
Roommates.com as an information content provider and thereby im-
posing liability based on the website's attempt to filter undesirable
content would ignore the text of the statute and discourage the kind of
filtering technology that Congress sought to promote.
Moreover, though Roommates.com did not use this technology to
filter obscenity, the wording of § 230 makes clear that the statute aims
to "remove disincentives for the development ... of blocking and fil-
tering technologies" that can be used to filter obscenity, no matter
207. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (emphasis added).
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who develops these technologies. 20 8 Surely, pornographic and ob-
scene websites are not going to develop the technologies to filter their
own content. The Ninth Circuit's decision could prevent websites of
all kinds from developing technologies that would both make their
own websites more navigable and "empower parents to restrict their
children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material[s] ."209
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's approach is a vastly inadequate
remedy for the problem of discriminatory housing ads on the Internet.
The court correctly decided that Roommates.com did not play a sig-
nificant enough role in the creation of the discriminatory comments
that users posted in the "Additional Comments" field of their profiles
to render it an information content provider.210 Thus, websites are
still free to allow discriminatory housing ads so long as they appear in
a vaguely titled comment box. Surely, bigots on the Internet did not
need Roommates.com's prompts to remind them of their bigoted
views, and they will continue to express those views in their housing
ads even if not prompted. The Fair Housing Council of San Fernando
Valley acknowledged that, even in light of the Ninth Circuit's holding,
the FHA is essentially dead in the online context.211 The only way to
effectively remedy the problem of discriminatory online housing ads
would be for Congress to add the FHA to the list of causes of action
that are exempt from § 230 immunity. 212 The ineffective solution of-
fered by the Ninth Circuit is not worth its cost to free speech on the
Internet.
V. CONCLUSION
The only benefit to the Ninth Circuit's decision is that websites can
no longer directly solicit illegal posts from users without fear of liabil-
ity. Presumably, an extremely small percentage of all objectionable or
illegal postings on the Internet are responses to direct prompts.
Moreover, if those direct prompts were eliminated, Internet users
wishing to post illegal materials online would surely still find a place
to post these materials.
This one relatively insignificant benefit is far outweighed by the nu-
merous drawbacks of upholding the decision. These include a poten-
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. Id.
210. Roommates.corn 11, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008); Roommates.corn 1, 489 F.3d at
929.
211. Appellant's Response for Rehearing, supra note 163, at 14.
212. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (listing exceptions to § 230 immunity).
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tially devastating effect on free speech online, uncertainty for website
operators seeking to host forums for dialog between users, a disincen-
tive for the development of technology that could be used to filter
obscene material, and a concern that making a website navigable
would subject the site's operator to liability. If all websites strictly
followed the Ninth Circuit's guidance, the Internet will eventually re-
semble a gigantic library with no cataloging system. Though this ex-
treme outcome is unlikely, any step in that direction directly
contradicts Congress's intent in enacting § 230.
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